JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION:
THE PROBLEMS OF COMMITMENT,
NON-CONTRACTIBILITY, AND
THE PROPER INCENTIVES
NICHOLAS S. ZEPPOSt

As befits any important case, Chevron' has produced what
might be considered several generations of commentary. In the
first, commentators debated the importance of Chevron for the
balance of power in the administrative state. In this context, some
viewed the decision as a troubling shift of power away from the
judiciary to the President.2 Others turned their attention to explaining why the Court announced the so-called Chevron doctrine.
The puzzle here was to explain the apparently selfless act of the
Court giving up its own power to overturn agency decisions.' Finally, when both the ramifications of and reasons for Chevron
began to be understood, academic commentators began speculating
whether the decision was still viable or whether it had proven to
have had little impact in the field of administrative law.4
It is against this dense background that Professors Shapiro
and Levy address Chevron and related problems of scope of review.' Despite the already extensive treatment of Chevron, they
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I am grateful to Jason Johnston and
Bob Rasmussen for helpful comments.
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Playing the Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 GEo. LJ. 523 (1992); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
3. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per
Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
4. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 3; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.. 969 (1992); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.
984.
5. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
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manage to add significantly to the understanding and discussion of
scope of review. Indeed, they go well beyond that to offer more
general insights and understandings about the behavior of the
judicial branch. Drawing on the rational choice literature, Shapiro
and Levy develop a model that identifies the interests that judges
seek to maximize and how those interests are implicated in the
field of administrative law.6 They then describe the ways in which
Chevron and its aftermath are related to the judiciary's efforts to
maximize its ideological interests. Ultimately criticizing what they
perceive as the demise of Chevron, they prescribe an ambitious
agenda for reforming not only the problem to which Chevron was
addressed-review of agency interpretation of a statute-but the
whole area of scope of review.7 It is an ambitious and creative
project indeed, and in doing so, Shapiro and Levy have advanced
the debate substantially.
My misgivings about their project stem almost entirely from
three central points. First, I believe that Shapiro and Levy move
too quickly in asserting the determinacy of the Chevron two-step.
As I argue below, a belief in the determinacy of that test must
arise primarily from the more general institutional realignment
identified with Chevron and not particularly from the test itself.
The move away from Chevron is explained by Shapiro and Levy
as a judicial effort to maximize ideological returns by shaping
indeterminate doctrine to replace the two-step test. I argue that
the dissembling of Chevron involved a more complex process in
which the inability of the Justices to secure and observe true commitments to the Chevron framework ex post doomed the Court's
project. This, in turn, is related to my second objection. Shapiro
and Levy seem to argue that determinacy of doctrine and deference are directly related. In fact, however, the relationship they
posit is not inevitable. Indeed, the current Supreme Court is developing what it believes to be a highly determinate doctrine of
statutory interpretation that gives little deference to administrative
agencies. In this respect, Shapiro and Levy fail to see that judges
will seek to develop determinate doctrines that-unlike Chevron-call for highly developed judicial craft skills. When this occurs, determinate doctrine will be used to curb agency action.

Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE U.

6. Id. at 1053-45, 1060-62.
7. Id. at 1071-74.
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Finally, although usefully broadening our understanding of Chevron to include judicial incentives, Shapiro and Levy ignore other
incentives and institutional arrangements. Chevron can be understood as affecting not only judicial incentives, but also significantly
altering the incentives for agencies. This change in the incentive
structure may have proven to be undesirable for the differing
proponents of deference to agencies-both those who believe that
agencies are due deference because of their reasoned exercise of
expert judgment and those who believe that agencies are more
politically accountable. Against this background, the post-Chevron
law that Shapiro and Levy seem to lament is in fact more stable
and better designed to serve the goals they articulate for themselves than the legislative amendments they offer.
I. THE CHEVRON CONTRACT AND THE PROBLEMS OF
COMMITMENT, OBSERVATION, AND VERIFICATION
Shapiro and Levy start their paper with a central but controversial proposition. They argue that Chevron put in place a new
and more determinate standard for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutory law. This more determinate craft norm
limited judges in their efforts to maximize their ideological interests on questions of agency policy.8 I say "controversial" because
it is not readily apparent that the Chevron two-step itself is determinate. The Court stated that if Congress had addressed the issue,
the agency interpretation was irrelevant because the will of the
legislature is supreme.' Earlier cases had set forth a similar formulation for review of agency action.'0 Left unresolved by Chevron were a number of important issues: How much ambiguity was
required before the case became a Chevron step-two case? What
materials were legitimately included among the traditional tools of
statutory construction to be used at step one? More specifically
and fundamentally, at the time Chevron was decided there was no
stable foundational doctrine of statutory interpretation to which
the Court could easily refer for resolution of step-one cases. In-

8. Id.
9.

at 1069.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842-43 (1984).
10. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278, 291 (1965).
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deed, it is no accident that the instability of Chevron coincided
with an enormous outburst of scholarly literature debating theories
of statutory interpretation." Moreover, the textualist revival was
being advanced in the lower courts by then-Judge Scalia." And
certainly with his arrival at the Supreme Court, the entire Chevron
step-one landscape became a major intellectual battlefield over
theories of statutory interpretation.
So the promise of determinacy and the stability of Chevron
were never really serious possibilities given the intellectual and political climate in which the case was to be applied. If there was
any possibility that Chevron could make the law more determinate, that may have had less to do with the two-part test than
with the attitude or mood reflected in the general rhetoric of the
opinion. 3 The Court cautioned that judges are not elected and
have no political constituencies. 4 On the other hand, administrative agencies are controlled by the President, who is directly accountable to the people. In other words, Chevron's potential for
certainty or determinacy was not in the two-part test, but in its
operation as a kind of super-strong default rule. Unless the party
challenging agency action could show a contrary intent by the
most compelling evidence, the agency's interpretation of the statute had to be upheld. Like the other canons being developed by
the Court, 5 the Chevron case shifted the burden to the challeng-

11. See, eg., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 20 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Prac.
tical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. LJ. 281 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Edward L. Rubin, Law and
Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989).
12. See FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361-64 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,

J., concurring).
13. It is not unusual to have the Court send signals about scope of review to the
lower courts in the form of mood and atmosphere. See Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-91 (1951).

14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984).
15. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-29 (1992); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 454-60
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er to show by a clear statement that the agency's decision was
contrary to legislative intent. 6
Thus, the commitment to certainty that Shapiro and Levy find
in Chevron probably did not come from the adopted two-part test.
Rather, the strong deference signals can be found in the more
general discussion and rhetoric of the opinion. The distinction is
significant for two reasons. First, it is relevant to whether reforms
that rewrite the standards of review to restate the Chevron test
will be worthwhile or successful. Second, it may offer another
explanation for why Chevron was so quickly eroded by the Court.
On Shapiro and Levy's account, we are still nonetheless left
to wonder why all of the participating Justices joined in the Chevron opinion. In fact, the puzzle becomes even more striking in
light of Shapiro and Levy's account of what judges choose to
maximize. They posit that judges like to achieve their ideological
outcomes and that this impulse is particularly strong in administrative law cases. Curbing the desire for ideological utility is the craft
norm that limits judicial discretion by putting the judge's reputation at stake for gross departures from doctrine. Thus, judges
should adopt vague craft norms to maximize ideological utility. If
this is so, then why was Chevron decided or written as it was in
the first place? On Shapiro and Levy's account, the Chevron twostep severely constrained judges yet it was unanimously adopted
contrary to their ideological self-interest.
As Shapiro and Levy note, others have offered hypotheses for
why the Court abdicated its own power in Chevron. Most of the
arguments advanced are institutional in character. Peter Strauss
argues that Chevron was a response to the Court's docket problems. 7 He suggests that the Court in Chevron opted for the national uniformity secured by the affirmance of the agency's views
because of the Court's- limited ability to correct the errors that
could occur in the lower courts and could severely disrupt national, uniform programs if they were not reviewed.18 Linda Cohen
and Matt Spitzer argue that Chevron was a necessary correction
by a conservative Supreme Court to signal to the more liberal

(1989).
16. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 860-62. 17. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 1117-22.
18. Id. at 1121.
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appellate court judges that the actions of the Republican agencies
should be given great deference.19
Shapiro and Levy do not dispute either of these explanations
and indeed seem to agree or assume that for the Court in 1984
Chevron represented a clear policy choice in favor of more deference and possibly an atypical judicial abdication of the power to
maximize ideological utility. Unless we explain Chevron as a simply overwritten and overstated blunder by the Court, it is hard to
offer a nonstrategic reason for the opinion. Many commentators
and lower court judges read the opinion as an important shift in
doctrine and as the definitive statement on deference. 2 ° Thus, it
seems sensible to credit some of the institutional arguments advanced in support of Chevron. Also, consistent with Shapiro and
Levy's rational-choice focus, we can assume that in giving up
ideological utility the Court believed that it was getting some
other benefit: more leisure time, fewer agency costs in administering the courts of appeals, or an increase in the craft quality of
other cases as a result of a lighter docket.
Chevron then can be understood as a kind of contractual
commitment by the Justices to forego ideological utility for other
goals. In this respect, all of the Justices are better off because
they all get the benefit of the Chevron rule. And because all of
them adhere to the rule, there is no danger of opportunistic behavior by a Justice to defect: the majority of adherents to Chevron
can outvote any Justice seeking to return to maximizing ideological utility. This last point is essential to the stability of the Chevron contract. If all of the Justices cooperate, they are all better
off. But if some of them forge a majority and cheat, then they will
be maximizing the ideological utility that their colleagues have
foregone, prompting others to defect as well. The chances of cooperation are enhanced when the Justices play the Chevron game
repeatedly. The liberal Justices know that if they defect and fail to
defer under Chevron, the conservative Justices will retaliate in
kind, which keeps the Justices cooperating.
Therefore, essential to the maintenance of the Chevron rule is
the ability of the Justices to cooperate in complying with that

19. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 3, at 68.
20. See sources cited supra note 2; Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the PostChevron Era, 3 YALE J. REG. 283, 306-07 (1986); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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agreement and to discover and retaliate for any breaches that
might occur. Although the repeat plays give the Justices ample
opportunity to monitor each other, the problem is that the amorphousness of the Chevron test makes accurate ex post monitoring
by the Justices almost impossible to undertake. Chevron seemed to
say "defer unless Congress's intent is clear." With this vague contract, there are severe problems in auditing and monitoring compliance. The Justices must be able to observe the behavior of their
colleagues. The Justices must also be able to verify breaches of
the agreement. I would suggest that these problems-particularly
those of verification-are so acute as to make the Chevron contract an impossible one to enter.21
All of the Justices post-Chevron have had ample opportunity
to observe the actions of each other. In the most public of judicial
actions, the Justices' votes to uphold or reject agency decisions
reveal their respective views on Chevron. Along with voting, the
Justices must also write opinions justifying results. When an agency decision is overturned, the opinion must explain whether or not
the Chevron framework is being followed. In their private discussions and deliberations as well, the Justices also observe each
other's behavior and commitment to Chevron.22
Despite these opportunities to observe Chevron compliance or
behavior, the Justices lacked any mechanism for accurately verifying whether in fact all were following the Chevron bargain.' In
24 the
the first major post-Chevron case, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
liberal Justices seemed to breach the Chevron deal and did not
defer. Using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the major-

21. For application and development of these concepts in contract law, see Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and
Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279-80 (1992). See generally Ronald J. Gilson
& Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994) (describing difficulty of monitoring
cooperative behavior between opposing counsel). The general concepts are explained in
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSrrIvE
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
22. See Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (1995) (reviewing internal deliberations reflected in transmittals between Justices Scalia and Stevens on whether the majority opinion in
Cardoza-Fonsecawas consistent with Chevron).
23. Here the problems of observability and verifiability overlap since the Justices
could not actually observe each other's state of mind through votes and opinions.
24. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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ity concluded that the intent of Congress was clear and contrary
to the agency's construction.' This rhetoric of the majority opinion-written by Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron-directly
rejected any claim that Cardoza-Fonseca was a departure from
Chevron.26 Despite this effort to claim fidelity to Chevron, the
more conservative dissenters would view the majority liberals as
defecting from the Chevron commitment. When three Justices
dissent and invoke the deference, principle of Chevron, they will
find it difficult to take seriously the majority's assertion that the
statute was so clear that no deference could be granted.27
The problem, therefore, was that even if the Justices' behavior
was observable in many ways, there remained no mechanism for
accurately verifying whether a breach of the agreement occurred.
Perhaps the solution to this verification problem was to be found
in the ideological lineup of Justices in a case like CardozaFonseca. But that was not a viable solution because of two complications. First, in a Court with three wings-liberal, conservative,
and moderate (or "crafters" to use the Shapiro and Levy language)-the ideological flanks may occasionally pick up votes from
the moderate or craft wing. When this occurs-particularly when
the moderate or craft wing oscillates in results-the ideological
breachers can claim fidelity to Chevron since the nonideological
Justices were essential to a majority. Second, when some of the
Justices refuse to defer by casting what might be considered contra-ideological votes, joining with their usual ideological opponents-i.e., conservative Justice joins liberal Justices to invalidate
conservative agency policy-the verification problems become difficult. The odd coalition provides a plausible basis for the claim
that there has actually been compliance with Chevron rather than
deference because the agency loses at step one. Here, ironically,
Justice Scalia-once a Chevron proponent-has proven to be instrumental in the unraveling of Chevron.' His adoption of an
25. See id. at 446.
26. Id. at 446-48.
27. This phenomenon is graphically illustrated by the cases in which the Court splits
5-4 with either the majority or a substantial minority insisting that no ambiguity exists to
trigger Chevron step two. See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 362 (1991); NLRB v.
Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 796 (1990). Consider also the remarkable
situation in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706 (1991), in which all
seven of the Justices in the majority found the statute ambiguous and upheld the
agency's views under Chevron step two. Justice Scalia insisted in a lone dissent that the
statute was clear and required the agency to lose at step one of Chevron. Id.
28. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
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interpretive theory that presumes textual determinacy has shifted
him into an anti-deference position, sometimes casting "liberal"
votes to form odd coalitions to invalidate agency decisions.29 Verifying who the Chevron cheaters are has proven to be extremely
difficult, even when most of the judicial behavior has been readily
observed.
Against this background, the rational strategy for the dissenters in Cardoza-Fonsecashould have been to defect from Chevron,
hoping to persuade some of the moderate or craft Justices that the
agency should lose at step one in the next liberal agency case.
They cannot allow the liberal Justices to follow Chevron selectively while they forego ideological utility for the good of the Court.
Of course, after that the liberal Justices may choose to cooperate
by again deferring and attempting to restore the Chevron equilibrium. The problem is that they may not have seen Cardoza-Fonseca
as a defection, but as a sincere application of Chevron responding
to a conservative defection with one of their own.
Thus, if we assume that Chevron was indeed designed as a
shift and that the strong language of the opinion reflected a general commitment by the Justices for more political control than
judicial control, there simply was no easy way for the Justices to
monitor and audit each other's behavior. What some Justices
might have viewed as an agency reversal under an application of
Chevron, another group might have perceived as a defection to
maximize ideological utility. When the latter group retaliates by
not deferring and the former believes that the retaliation was
unwarranted, the result may be a return to the pre-Chevron uncertainty. The Chevron agreement was not only short-lived but
doomed from the beginning.
The agreement and auditing problems outlined above might
have been even more severe than initially suggested, particularly
for the more liberal Justices. After Chevron, with a Republican

WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 366 (1994) (describing how Justice Scalia's commitment to textualism

permits him to find a statute's "plain meaning" more frequently and thus requires less
deference to agency interpretations).
29. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1594
(1994); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423-54 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chief Justice Rehnquist; the Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism, and
the Originalist Fallacy, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 679, 688-97 (1994) (arguing that Justice Scalia's
quest for methodological consistency will lead him to cast votes contrary to his ideological preferences in the individual case).
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President, we would expect that the policies of the administrative
agencies would be more conservative. For the conservative Justices, the Chevron commitment may be relatively costless. Rarely,
if ever, will there be a case that reviews a liberal agency action.
Thus, the conservative Justices can commit themselves to cooperate and play by the Chevron rules and still maximize their ideological utility. Under Chevron, mostly conservative agency actions
will be upheld under the deference rule. The conservative justices
can consistently pledge their commitment to Chevron without ever
sacrificing ideological utility. The danger for the liberal Justices is
obvious. The liberal Justices may legitimately fear that the conservative Justices will abandon Chevron when the White House shifts
to the other party. Fearing this bait and switch tactic by the conservatives, the liberal Justices will rationally begin to defect almost
immediately after Chevron. True to this prediction, the conservative Justices seemed to abruptly shift their views on Chevron without even awaiting the election of a Democratic President, aggressively reviewing some of the positions taken by agencies under
President Bush.3 °
In sum, the ex post monitoring and auditing problems with
the Chevron commitment are enormous. The Justices will not be
able to separate out sincere agency reversals under Chevron from
defections to maximize ideological utility. More fundamentally,
with agency policies skewed on the political spectrum, the Justices
who are truly sacrificing ideological utility in the early aftermath
of Chevron will rationally fear conservative defections after a
change in the White House. Knowing this, the rational strategy
becomes almost immediate defection from Chevron.
II. DETERMINATE CRAFr NoRMs AND
THE RELATIONSHIP TO JuDIcIAL REVIEW

Shapiro and Levy relate determinate craft norms to Chevron
and the restoration of the primacy of political accountability as the
dominant form of control on agency decisionmaking.3 ' But there

30. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539-41 (1992); Presley v. Etowah
County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1992); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 257 (1991), overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (Supp.
IV 1994).
31. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 5, at 1068 ("[M]ost cases would be resolved in favor
of the agency ... under the determinate version of Chevron.").
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is no clear relationship between determinate craft norms and deference to agencies. In other words, it is possible to have what
appear to be more determinate craft norms for judicial review but
have power taken away from administrative agencies. This is most
dramatically illustrated by the fiercely determinate textualism of
Justice Scalia, but is increasingly apparent in the work of the
entire Court.32 Three developments in particular demonstrate this
point.
First, there is an almost fanatical movement in the Court to
have dictionary definitions control the meaning of statutes.33 This
trend now includes those cases in which the agency has interpreted a statute as well. The Court has not hesitated to invalidate an
agency's action when the agency has read a statute in a way that
is contradicted by a consensus of meaning found in the dictionaries. 4 Unfortunately for agencies, the use of dictionaries is a oneway street. That is, even though an agency interpretation that conflicts with the consensus dictionary definition is presumed invalid,
evidence of conflicting dictionary definitions does not by itself
make a statute ambiguous; this would make it a Chevron step-two
case.35 The Court seems to believe that it has made doctrine
more determinate by using dictionaries as a predictable source of
meaning. But the result has been to exert greater judicial control
over administrative agencies.
Second, the Court has increasingly used structural and linguistic canons of interpretation in ways that seem to make doctrine
more determinate. Again, however, the effect has been to limit
agency discretion. Two of the structural canons in particular illustrate the point. Consider first expressio unius est exclusio
alterius-the expression of one item implies exclusion of others.
The typical case in the agency context is when Congress has authorized the agency to take action X or regulate X, and the agency then proceeds to undertake Y or regulate Y. There are two
ways to understand the express reference to X and the absence of
reference to Y in the statute. It can be viewed as legislative inad32. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term,
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 73 (1994) (describing certainty of
textualism and its effects on agencies).
33. See id. at 73-74; Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation,
107 HARV. L REv. 1437 (1994).
34. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (1994).
35. See id. at 2229-30; Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994).
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vertence or inattention, which suggests ambiguity; or it can be
understood as a conscious legislative decision to draw the regulatory boundary at X and not to allow Y. The former, of course, is a
Chevron step-two case, while the latter would be resolved against
the agency at step one. The expressio unius canon adopts the
latter understanding of structure and therefore operates as a significant restraint upon the agency. The Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals have now firmly committed themselves to using
this canon to constrain agency power.36
Of similar limiting effect is the canon noscitur a sociis-a
word is known by the meaning of surrounding words. The canon
is typically invoked in a case in which the statute gives the agency
a list of powers to exercise. The question is whether the terms in
the list all share a common meaning or whether more general
terms in the list convey broader powers. The situation obviously
poses a problem of statutory ambiguity, but the ambiguity is eliminated by use of the canon. The general power claimed by the
agency is constrained by the common meaning-again the dictionary-given to the surrounding words.
These two canons were recently invoked by the D.C. Circuit
in Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt37 and demonstrate the way in
which they impose limits on agencies. The issue in Sweet Home
Chapter was the legality of the EPA's regulation that makes destruction of animal habitat a violation of the Endangered Species
Act.3 The Act makes it a crime for any person to "take" any
endangered species. "Take" is defined to mean "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."39 The D.C. Circuit held
that the EPA's interpretation was contrary to the statute.40 Central to the court's analysis were the two structural canons. The
court first noted that all of the terms in the definition "contem-

36. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1591-92
(1994); Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995); Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation
Bd., 988 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g en banc, 29 F.3d 655, 666 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1995) (No. 94-890); Wachtel v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
37. 17 F.3d at 1465.
38. Id. at 1464.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
40. Sweet Home Chapter, 17 F.3d at 1464-65.
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plate the perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal."'" Invoking noscitur a sociis, the court concluded that the
word "harm" could not be read to include habitat modification,
but rather, like all of the other terms, applied only to actions directed toward an endangered species itself.42 The court also relied
upon the fact that other provisions of the Act expressly allowed
the EPA to take actions for habitat preservation and tellingly
allowed for purchase of private property to protect the rights of
owners. For the court, these other express references to habitat
protection implied that no such authority was granted in the gen43
eral prohibition section-expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Ambiguity is eliminated through the use of these structural canons
with doctrine more determinate but agencies worse off.
Finally, the Supreme Court has developed a set of substantive
interpretive canons that constrain agency decisionmaking while
making doctrine more determinate. Assume that a statute administered by an agency is ambiguous. Presumably under Chevron,
this case should be resolved under step two. But if the substantive
canons are invoked to eliminate the ambiguity or shift the burden
of proof to the agency to show that the power to act is explicitly
authorized, the case now becomes a loss for the agency at step
one of Chevron. There is an intersection here between the Court's
development of constitutional or quasi-constitutional norms:' outside of administrative law and the review of agency decisions that
transgress these newly invigorated constitutional protections. Thus,
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,45 in which the Court invalidated the
NLRB's interpretation allowing union organizers access to the
private property of the owner, is fully consistent with the Court's
recent cases giving greater constitutional protection for property
rights.' Presley v. Etowah County Commission,.' in which the
Court invalidated the Department of Justice's reading of the Voting Rights Act to cover changes in the internal structures of gov-

41. Id. at 1465.
42. Id. at 1466.
43. Id.
44. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15.
45. 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992).
46. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
47. 502 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1992).
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ernment, involved not only the Court's enhanced protection of
federalism interests,' but also presaged the Court's increasing
sense that an aggressive reading of the Voting Rights Act may
collide with equal protection principles.49
These three developments-dictionaries, structural canons, and
substantive canons-all illustrate that determinacy in administrative
law is not directly related to greater deference to agencies. In fact,
these trends demonstrate that the opposite might be true-development of craft norms that maximize judicial reputational utility
appears to be related to less deference. What Shapiro and Levy
are apparently searching for is not necessarily more determinacy,
but less judicial adventurism. However, these three developments
demonstrate that the Shapiro and Levy argument in favor of a
Chevron-like regime of review will fail under their own construct.
Shapiro and Levy posit that judges can maximize reputation
through craft excellence or maximize ideology while sacrificing
craft. In either case, giving up ideological utility allows the judge
to gain in reputational craft utility. But the broad deference position that was the basis for Chevron, as well as for the Shapiro and
Levy reform, not only requires the judge to give up ideological
utility but craft utility as well. A broad reading of Chevron tells
the judge to defer if any ambiguity is found. Once the ambiguity
is found, the craft task is over. In the typical administrative law
case, it is probably true that finding ambiguity is easier than finding clarity.5" Chevron therefore gave judges less opportunity to
48. See id. at 510; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15, at 619-25 (discussing federalism cases); see also United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3039 (Apr.
26, 1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress's power under Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992)
("State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government.").
49. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) ("A reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise
widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, . .. bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid."); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591, 2592 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for limited interpretation of the Voting Rights Act in
vote dilution cases in order to discourage "racial 'balkaniz[ation]' of the Nation").
50. It may be that in certain cases it takes great craft skills to show ambiguity. But
the incentives for the judge to demonstrate them appear absent. Assume that a judge is
following the reading of Chevron that is in favor of broad deference. She decides that
step two is triggered when an ambiguity level of 20% is found. Once the judge gets to
that point-or just beyond it for insurance-she has no incentive to demonstrate skills to
tease out more ambiguity. There is no payoff for doing so. But if a judge is going to set
aside agency action under step one of Chevron, when there is a 70% level of confidence
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display those craft skills that earn them reputations for greatness.
And, as noted above, they did so without getting any ideological
utility in return. Craft in statutory interpretation is now being
practiced by the Court-particularly in what appears to be a highly sophisticated way by some Justices-but usually in cases that
the agency loses at step one of Chevron. The trade-off suggested
by Shapiro and Levy was never a fair one for the judicial branch
and therefore did not occur.
III. CHEVRON AND AGENCY INCENTIVES, CONGRESS AS THE
MECHANISM FOR COMMITMENT, AND THE NEED FOR

MoRE DETERMINATE CRAFT NORMS

My third objection to the Shapiro and Levy proposal is that,
like much of their paper, it looks only at judicial incentives and
ignores the impact of Chevron or a Chevron-type review statute
on both agencies and Congress. This narrow focus causes me to
doubt the efficacy of and reasons for their proposal to amend the
APA. Moreover, the substitution of legislative action for judicial
crafting of standards of review is likely to prove futile, particularly
if-as the Shapiro and Levy proposal implies-substantial leeway
to develop and implement these new review standards is left to
the courts.
Start first with agency incentives. What impact did Chevron
have on agencies? I would suggest that the Chevron rule created
bad incentives for the agencies by skewing agency resources in
undesirable ways and shifting the power within the agency, as well
as altering the power relationship between the agency and the
agency's lawyer, the Department of Justice. It soon became clear
that the overwhelming significance of Chevron focused upon the
step-one analysis. Agencies would respond to this with a rational
strategy. The significance of Chevron step one would lead the
agency to devote more resources to the legalistic analysis that was
at the core of Chevron step one than to policy expertise or political balancing. Chevron encouraged the agency to win at step one
or at least to demonstrate sufficient ambiguity to make it a steptwo case.5 ' Therefore, scarce agency resources would be shifted
that the agency is wrong, the judge will have to demonstrate more skills to get to that
point, and indeed may be driven to go past that point to justify substituting the judicial
judgment for that of the agency.
51. A rational agency might always prefer to get past step one and win at step two.

1148

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1133

away from explanations that a court and the public might find
more helpful. Even if the agency's resources are not scarce, the
responsibility for explaining and justifying the agency's decision
may reside even more exclusively in the hands of the agency's
general counsel office. It is the agency lawyers who are expert at
the legalistic expressions and justifications that Chevron step one
accentuates, and therefore we should expect that the agency strategy will adjust accordingly. This may not be bad as long as policy
and expertise are expressed in the explanation as well; however,
time, space, and expertise limits may lead the agency lawyer to
emphasize the law over the policy 2 Few would suggest that
agencies are created to lend their expertise or accountability to
doing strictly legal analysis.
But this is only part of the picture. Agencies must do battle
not only with the courts to justify their decisions but with their
lawyer as well-the Department of Justice. 3 Since most agencies
have no independent litigating authority, they have their views
presented and defended in court only if the Department-usually
through the Solicitor General-finds their views plausible. 4
Again, insofar as Chevron step one assumed importance, the
Department's role was only strengthened. It is the Department's
lawyers-generalists to be sure, but specialists in federal statutory
and administrative law-who are the true experts in doing the
Chevron step-one analysis. Chevron then raised the potential for
policy disputes within the executive branch to be controlled by the

If it wins at step one, it cannot later shift its position. This might not be the case when
the agency is controlled by a strong President who wants to freeze his reading of the
statute to bind successors and who therefore prefers to win the case at step one.
52. Consider the impact of the Supreme Court's highly textual analysis of a banking
statute in Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 363 (1986) (discussing Bank Holding Co. Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-1850)). In the wake of Dimension, a series of administrative opinions by the
federal banking agencies took on a textual character and often cited the case. See Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Applications of American Security Bank,
N.A., Washington, D.C. and Maryland National Bank, Baltimore Maryland, 1994 OCC
Ltr. 9 (Feb. 4, 1994); Commercial Paper Activities of Bankers Trust Co. of New York
Do Not Constitute Underwriting Securities, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11 86,270,
90,823, 90,828 (June 4, 1985); Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Underwriting and Dealing in Certain Securities, 73 Fed. Res. Bd. Bull. 473, 475 (1987).
53. See Michael Herz, Comment, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference
for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1663, 1681 (1991).
.54. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) (reserving the power to conduct such litigation to the
Department of Justice); 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (1994).
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Department, with disagreements expressed in Chevron step-one
terms and the Chevron step-one threat always available for use by
the Department (often at the behest of other agencies or OMB)
to block agency initiatives. There is much to be said in favor of
stronger presidential control over agency decisionmaking.' It remains to be demonstrated that it was ideal or rational for this
oversight to occur by the Department of Justice wielding the cudgel of Chevron step one.
These secondary effects of Chevron or a Chevron-like rule are
not part of the Shapiro and Levy equation. Yet it surely seems
odd to be proposing changes in judicial review of agency decisions
without asking what incentives are created for agencies under the
proposal. Shapiro and Levy do propose significant and extensive
amendments to the scope of review section of the Administrative
Procedure Act,5 6 but agency behavior and institutional incentives
are not targeted by their amendment. They claim that the suggested changes will restore the determinacy to scope of review that
began with Chevron and State Farm57 but did not endure. In
making their suggestions, they do not directly enter into the debate about what standard of review is most consistent with separation of powers principles. They propose what they claim to be an
"intermediate" view that preserves the judiciary's ability to enforce
the rule of law, but without allowing courts to intrude into the
sphere of legitimate agency policy choice.58 In setting forth their
amendments, they readily concede that no statutory standard can
resolve every case or always constrain judicial choice. They do
predict that more precise standards will channel judicial inquiry in.
a way that makes departures from craft norms more costly, and
therefore will serve as a deterrent to judicial ideological
adventurism.

55. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(Supp. 1995); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988); Lawrence Lessig & Cass

L Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94

COLUM. L. REv. 1, 85-86, 93-108 (1994); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H.
Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080-82
(1986).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 5, at 1072.
57. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
58. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 5, at 1070-71.
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Their proposal is comprehensive, yet their narrow focus on
restoring a Chevron-type review standard leaves me pessimistic
that the reform will occur. Moreover, by proposing general and
vague standards for review, they have ignored various craft norms
that might be better in changing agency and judicial incentives in
ways that Shapiro and Levy may find desirable. Shapiro and Levy
may be correct that the Justices were quite unwilling to give up
their power post-Chevron. Yet the prospects for legislative relief
remain uncertain even if the legislature rather than the Court acts
as the third-party enforcer to secure a commitment to a new set
of more determinate craft norms. The scope of review standard
outlined by Shapiro and Levy for guiding review of agency interpretations of statutory law may be as subjective and open-ended
as those articulated in Chevron. Moreover, we saw that the determinacy of Chevron came not so much from the two-part test as
the general signal sent by the Court. Thus, the proposed APA
amendments may suffer from the same infirmities that we saw in
Chevron: the actual test is unlikely to provide serious constraint
and the general exhortation to defer unless the law is clear will
leave judges with substantial discretion. In this respect, the judiciary will again prove to be pivotal in implementing, defining, and
monitoring the new statute. And the same problems of discerning
real defections and auditing will arise.
The ambitious but (I fear) largely hortatory effort made by
Shapiro and Levy fails to take account of the broad variation in
statutory questions and contexts that arise across the many different types of administrative agencies. Statutory questions in administrative law are unlikely to be captured under one simple formulation. This all suggests that to seriously inject the idea of craft
norms into administrative law doctrine requires formulation beyond the simple and general Chevron two-step, whether it be
found in caselaw or statutory law. Statutory cases are too idiosyncratic or unique to achieve consistency in generally stated craft
norms across a wide spectrum of cases. The process of comparing
clarity or unmistakable intent from case to case will produce few
true examples in which craft can be readily observed. Indeed,
post-Chevron law quickly disintegrated into a sequence of charges
and countercharges about who did or did not defer in the last
case. The solution must be to seek out craft norms that transcend
the particular statutory analysis, that can then be applied across all
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agencies despite the diversity of text, legislative history, or statutory purposes.
Here I would urge them to look both at pre- and post-Chevron law. As others have observed, the pre-Chevron approach was
contextual and practical, focusing on a number of factors and not
simply on the narrow Chevron step-one inquiry." The whole of
the agency decisionmaking process and its placement in statutory
law was critical in deciding the deference question. These factors
included the consistency of the agency's position over time, the
amount of time that the policy has been in place, the form of the
agency action, and whether the agencies involved have all spoken
with a single voice on the issue.' Under both the traditional6'
as well as the more modem defense62 of this approach, these factors were deemed relevant to the ultimate persuasiveness of the
agency's decision. The advantage of these factors for Shapiro and.
Levy's proposed reform is that they provide clearer craft norms
that transcend the individual statutory setting. There certainly will
be instances when the courts do not consider these factors or
apply them inconsistently. But the more precise and portable character of these factors across statutes and agencies assures that the
reputational sanctions that Shapiro and Levy seek will in fact be
felt by those who do not play the game by the rules. Judges who
ignore them will be seen as ideological maximizers whose reputations should decline accordingly.
Another major advantage of this approach is that it has the
possibility of producing a relatively stable judicial consensus across
the spectrum of ideological judges. With different ideologies, judges will obviously disagree in individual cases whether the agency
should prevail or not. But the differing judges may agree that the
review standards should be created in a way to promote fair,
unbiased, rational, and politically accountable decisionmaking.
Some of the contextual factors outlined above are directly related
to these more universal goals of administrative government. Con-

59. See Merrill, supra note 28, at 352 (contrasting Chevron with "the older pragmatic
tradition that emphasized a variety of contextual factors"); Merrill, supra note 4, at 972
(calling pre-Chevron test "pragmatic and contextual").
60. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 1016-22.
61. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
62. See Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 105-07 (1st
Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.); Merrill, supra note 4, at 1016-22; see also Sunstein, supra note 15,
at 443-46 (arguing against a general rule of deference to agency interpretations).
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sider the problem of a conflict in views among administrative
agencies. A judge believing that political accountability is a bedrock principle of scope of review law will be keenly interested in
whether the agencies are in conflict. The problem most frequently
arises when an independent agency, not subject to direct Presidential control,' disagrees with the views of a purely executive agency. In the 1980s, the politically independent Federal Reserve
Board opposed the deregulatory measures of the more politically
accountable Department of the Treasury and Comptroller of the
Currency. The Board's actions to halt deregulation were consistently invalidated by the courts. 64 No deference to the Board was65
granted because of the schism among the banking agencies.
This is desirable for judges who want politically accountable agencies. The unaccountable Board is due less deference when the
President and his subordinates set forth a different policy view.
The conflict among agencies will also be relevant for those judges
who seek to further deliberation and rationality in agency
decisionmaking. It may suggest haste by the Board in taking action or an absence of persuasiveness to its rationale.66
Acting in the shadow of these contextual factors is not without cost to the agency. Under the view set forth by Shapiro and
Levy, there would be a freeing up of agency resources since the
apparent decline in scrutiny would lessen the burdens on agency
decisionmaking. But these factors are quite different from the
unpredictable and vacillating judicial attitudes of either strict or
deferential review. These contextual factors tend to place the
agency in the position of controlling the amount of deference it
receives. They are designed not simply to operate as ex post justifications for a result but to alter the incentives for agency action.67 An agency that is aware ex ante that a conflict in agency
63. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624-26 (1935) (describing independence of Federal Trade Commission from executive control); see also id. at
610-11 (same, in oral argument of William J. Donovan).
64. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986); Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1031
(1992); Synovus Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 952 F.2d 426, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1991); cf.
FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (invalidating
FDIC regulation opposed by the Department of Treasury and Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice).
65. See Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1991).
66.

For a good example of this view, see Judge Newman's discussion in Citicorp, id.

at 75.
67.

See Merrill, supra note 4, at 1029 (arguing that the Chevron focus on judicial
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views or a shift in agency position will tend to lower the amount
of deference can plan accordingly and make up for the loss by
articulating its position more carefully or with more support from

practical experience. As noted above, Chevron created no such
incentives and indeed skewed them in particularly perverse ways.
In suggesting that so much was at stake in step one of the analysis, the message sent to agencies was to make sure that they devote their time to explaining why either they win at step one, or
why the statute is ambiguous and warrants only the minimal scrutiny under step two. With limited resources and staff, the agencies
were forced not to do what they are supposed to do best-apply
their expertise or resolve political or policy disagreements rationally-but to channel these scarce resources into legalistic formulations.
Therefore, Shapiro and Levy would be better off to insert
into their reform package the factors that can indeed be identified
as craft norms.6 By doing so, they will at least allow for the enforcement of the reputational sanctions that simply could not be
administered under Chevron and likely would prove to be ephem-

eral under their proposal as well. Moreover, in making the agency
"earn" deference, the traditional factors create the proper incentives for agency action as well as halting the diversion of agency
resources from explaining and justifying expert policy judgments to
legalistic explanations. In this last respect, this incentive-based
behavior creates no incentives for agencies). This incentive theory of earning deference
can be seen in a variety of contexts. One is that in which the Court alters its level of
deference and the aggressiveness of its Chevron step-one posture depending on how the
agency expressed its views. See Massachusetts v. FDIC, 47 F.3d 456, 459 (1st Cir. 1995)
(noting that choice of whether to adopt formal adjudication up to agency but further
stating that doing so would consume agency resources and earn agency greater deference); New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1995)
(agency may adopt interpretive rules without notice and comment or even more informal
"no-action" letters but these are entitled to less deference than formally adopted legislative rules); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct.
517, 531 (1993) (leaving open whether agency position adopted in brief was entitled to
deference, but finding such a position first articulated in the Solicitor General's amincus
brief unpersuasive); Callejo v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1497, 1499 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (tying standard of review of agency decision to whether agency proceeded by informal adjudication or formal adjudication controlled by promulgated regulations). In a recent decision, the Court has also suggested that the agency's views are due less weight
when the agency has sought to preclude judicial review of its decisions. See Brown v.
Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 557 (1994).
68. For an earlier effort to do so, see generally Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review
Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239 (1986).
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approach at least allows the agency to play some role in determining the reception it will receive when judicial review is sought, and
makes the deference analysis less likely to appear as conclusory
judicial whim. Given that it is the fear of the latter that dominates
not only the Shapiro and Levy paper but the more general discourse on Chevron and scope of review, the former may be
viewed at least as a small step forward in working out the relationship between courts and agencies.

